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Anne 0.  Krueger 
Preferential regional trading arrangements are in vogue. As of the end of 1994, 
GATT had received notification of  33 new agreements since 1990. Most of 
these arrangements are for free trade areas (FTAs), although the European 
Union has also been enlarging its membership. As of  1994, there were few 
members of GATT that did not belong to at least one preferential trading ar- 
rangement, and many belonged to more than one.’ 
Additional FTAs are currently under discussion and, in a number of cases, 
officially endorsed.  Moreover,  it is contemplated  that  some of  these FTAs 
might be overlapping. The United States, for example, is already a member of 
NAFTA, also has an FTA with Israel, and has declared its intention to partici- 
pate in an Asia Pacific (APEC) FTA. The APEC countries have announced that 
they will become an FTA by 2010 (for the developed countries) and 2020 (for 
the developing).* In the spring of  1995, there was even discussion of  a North 
Atlantic Free Trade Area, which might entail U.S. membership in yet another 
FTA. In addition, the United States extends preferences unilaterally to coun- 
tries eligible under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and tariff preferences 
to developing countries under the Generalized System of Preferences. Chile, 
which has sought negotiations to enter into an FTA  with NAFTA,  has an- 
nounced its intention to join APEC and to enter into an FTA with the European 
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I. World Trade Organization (WTO 1995, 1). Notable exceptions, pointed out by  the WTO, 
were Japan and Hong Kong, who belonged to no reciprocal preferential arrangement, although 
Japan did and does extend tariff preferences to developing countries. 
2. From the communiquis from APEC, it is unclear whether “free trade area” means a discrimi- 
natory, preferential trading area or an area all of whose members practice free trade. 
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Union. Countries already signatory to MERCOSUR (which is a customs union 
among Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay) have indicated their inten- 
tion to join NAFTA. 
In supporting the formation of FTAs, political leaders have generally reas- 
serted their support for the open multilateral system and indicated that WAS 
are intended to be “GATT-plus’’ (now “WTO-plus”) arrangements that would 
go beyond the agreements already existing multilaterally and seek even freer 
trade among “like-minded trading  nation^."^ A number of  economists have 
taken this view, regarding the formation of  PTAs  as a step along the way  to 
liberalizing trade m~ltilaterally.~ 
Supporters of  the open multilateral trading system, with its most-favored- 
nation (MFN) principle implying an absence of discrimination among trading 
partners, have raised questions about preferential trading arrangements. These 
questions have been based on the concern that the emergence of regional trading 
arrangements, including both FTAs and customs unions (especially the Euro- 
pean Union), would erode support for the open multilateral trading system and 
hence serve as a WTO substitute, rather than as a WTO-plus arrangement. If 
this happened, the emergence of regional trading blocs would be accompanied 
by increasing trade frictions and perhaps rising trade barriers between blocs. 
When attention is given to overlapping preferential trading arrangements, 
additional issues arise. Those concerns are the focus of this paper. To set the 
stage, section 1.1 reviews the prevalence of preferential trading arrangements 
as of the inauguration of the WTO. Section 1.2 reviews the salient issues that 
arise with respect to FTAs and customs unions in assessing the extent to which 
they are WTO-plus and likely to be conducive to further multilateral trade lib- 
eralization. Section 1.3 then points to the additional complexities that are likely 
to arise if overlapping FTAs become the order of the day. Next, consideration 
is given in section 1.4 to East Asia’s interests in the international economy and 
the choices open to East Asian nations if  the trend toward FTAs  continues. 
Section 1.5 summarizes the argument. 
1.1  Preferential Trading Arrangements 
Referential trading arrangements can take any number of forms. They may 
consist of unilateral preferences or reciprocal preferences. They may be partial 
or total with respect to the degree of  preference extended to members. And 
they may be partial or total with respect to those portions of international trade 
3. It is not clear why regional arrangements began proliferating in the 1980s.  In part, the success 
of the European integration was a factor, as is discussed below. Historically, the United States 
announced its change of position after the GAlT Ministerial of 1982, when the U.S. Trade Repre- 
sentative (USTR) was frustrated by failure to agree on the start of a new round of multilateral 
trade negotiations. 
4. Lawrence (1991) has been perhaps most closely associated with a defense of regional ar- 
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to which preferences pertain. They may be restricted to trade in goods or in 
goods and services, or they may apply also to factor mobility. And they may 
be limited to border measures, or they may entail setting rules and discipline 
for domestic regulations. 
For the purposes of  this paper, focus will be on reciprocal  preference^.^ 
Among these, two especially will be considered: customs unions and free trade 
agreements. For, in terms of the major trading countries and the Asia Pacific 
region, it is these two forms that are currently contemplated. And, although 
arrangements with respect to factor flows and harmonization can take place 
under either an FTA or a customs union, the essential differences center on the 
fact that a customs union entails a common external tariff among its members 
whereas a free trade arrangement allows each member to retain its own tariff 
structure. Moreover, attention will be devoted only to arrangements that are 
100 percent preferences, since those are the ones that are contemplated under 
NAFTA, APEC, and any North Atlantic Free Trade Area.6 
That difference, however, is crucial. It is crucial for two reasons. First, it is 
likely that FTAs are less suited to being WTO-plus arrangements than are cus- 
toms unions. Second, it is not possible to have overlapping customs unions.’ 
Countries are either inside a wall of common external tariffs or they are outside 
of  it. Hence, the problems raised by  overlapping preferential arrangements 
could not arise if they were customs unions. Attention returns to this point in 
section 1.3. 
Table  1. I gives a list of the reciprocal integration agreements in effect as of 
January 1995. The most striking feature of table 1.1 is the number of arrange- 
ments that already exist, including overlapping FTAs. Israel, for example, has 
FTAs with both the United States and the European Union. Norway is in the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and has FTAs with the European 
Union and the Baltic states. 
A second striking feature of table 1.1  is that, with the exception of the Israel- 
U.S. FTA, the arrangements are all regional.* While there is no reason in prin- 
ciple why preferential trading arrangements should be regi~nal,~  the vast ma- 
5. This leaves out the Generalized System of Preferences, Lome Convention, CBI, and other 
one-way extension of preferences. It may be argued that acceptance of these preferential arrange- 
ments contributed to the erosion of the nondiscriminatory aspects of the world trading system, 
but it seems clear that concerns now center on reciprocal relationships, such as NAFTA and the 
European Union. 
6. In theory, the optimal preference (if any) probably lies between zero and 100 percent. 
7. A country can enter into a free trade agreement with a customs union. This has, in effect, 
been done by many countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
8. “Regional” does not always imply contiguous. Switzerland’s agreements with the Baltic states 
and with other EFTA countries are not all geographically proximate. 
9. Many earlier preferential arrangements were not regional. The system of Commonwealth 
preferences is perhaps the best-known example. Regional arrangements do take advantage of the 
fact that trading partners are closer to each other and hence face relatively low transport costs for 
cross-border transactions. However, in the 1990s, with transport costs accounting for a very small 
percentage of the value of  trade, the advantage gained by proximity is probably quite small. Table 1.1 
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Table 1.1  (continued) 
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Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) 
Central American Common Market 
Latin American Integration Association 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) 
Middle East 
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
Asia 
Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER) 
Bangkok Agreement‘ 
ASEAN Preferential Trade Agreement 
Source: WTO (1995,26). 
“Turkey entered into a customs union (in nonagricultural goods) with the European Union on 
1 January 1996. 
bThe Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic have entered into a customs union, and each has a 
free trade agreement with Slovenia. 
‘Thailand also has preferential trade agreement with Lao Democratic Republic. 
jority of those to date have been. Even the proposed FTA  encompassing the 
APEC countries, which spans both sides of the Pacific, is billed as being re- 
gional in nature. 
As already noted, there are FTAs under discussion in addition to those listed 
in table  1.1, which  were already notified to GATTNTO by  January  1995. 
Those arrangements would greatly increase the coverage of FTAs and, in addi- 
tion, would change the “overlapping” aspect of FTAs from being an occasional 
phenomenon to being the rule rather than the exception. 
1.2  Salient Aspects of Preferential Arrangements 
Under Article 24 of GATT/WTO rules, preferential arrangements were and 
are permissible as long as preferences (1) are 100 percent, (2) cover substan- 
tially all trade, (3) do not raise protection against third countries, and (4) have 
a definite timetable for implementation. However, GATT panels deciding on 
whether particular arrangements meet these tests have  seldom been able to 
reach decisions, and the legal requirements for satisfying these criteria are 
therefore subject to considerable debate.  lo De facto, however, when the United 
10. See WTO (1995, chap. 1, esp. 5-18).  Because GATT panels have often been unable toreach 
decisions regarding the conformity of  proposed arrangements with Article 24, there are a number 
of suggestions for changing the rules in order to make the standards clearer. Insofar as the prob- 
lems raised in this paper (and elsewhere-see  Krueger 1995) are deemed serious, consideration 
might be given to restricting coverage of Article 24 to customs unions. 14  Anne 0.  Krueger 
States or the European Union decides to enter into such an agreement or to 
enlarge an existing one, it is a sufficiently important member of the WTO that 
its decision will be endorsed, or at least not be found to be in contravention of 
the articles.” 
Traditionally, analysis of the welfare effects of preferential trading arrange- 
ments has centered on the positive welfare effects of trade creation (when high- 
cost production in one member country is shut down as lower-cost competing 
goods from a partner country displace it) and the negative welfare effects of 
trade diversion (when a member country replaces imports from a low-cost 
source in the rest of the world with imports from a higher-cost member). The 
analysis has been extended in a variety of  ways,  including the potential in- 
crease in welfare in the case of trade diversion that might result from consum- 
ers’ gain from lower prices for the imported good that might partially or more 
than totally offset the welfare costs of trade diversion, the possibility that in- 
creased competition will result in greater efficiency and lower costs for indi- 
vidual producers, and under increasing returns to scale the larger market that 
might result for goods produced under conditions of imperfect competition. 
Nonetheless, because formation of a preferential trading arrangement is clearly 
second-best to free trade, analysis of  its welfare effects is necessarily am- 
biguous. 
That a customs union will in general increase potential welfare more (or 
reduce it less) than an FTA has been pointed out elsewhere (see Krueger 1995). 
It is important, however, to note the reason, since it is central to understanding 
some of the difficulties that arise when contemplating overlapping free trade 
agreements. That is, rules of origin (ROOs) are a far more central feature of 
free trade agreements than they are of customs unions. That is because of the 
possibility of “trade deflection” that arises under an FTA  and not under a cus- 
toms union.I2 
Rules of origin, while inherently a part of FTAs, can serve protectionist pur- 
poses. The “triple transformation” rule, used by the United States with respect 
to Mexican textiles and apparel, for example, extends preferential treatment to 
Mexican exports of apparel only if the raw material has been transformed into 
thread, the thread into cloth, and the cloth into a garment, all within the FTA. 
It may be that such a rule is designed to ensure that foreign apparel does not 
enter through Mexico, but it is more likely that Mexican apparel producers 
may be enticed to purchase textiles from the United States, and even perhaps 
11. The language of Article 24 is also very vague, so that few GATT panels charged with as- 
sessing the consistency of an FTA  with the GAlT have been able to reach a conclusion. 
12. Without ROOs, any FTA  would in fact become a customs union. This can be most easily 
seen by  assuming the absence of  transport costs. If there were no ROOs in an FTA, importers 
would import goods through the country with the lowest tariff and then transship them (i.e., “de- 
flect” them) to the country where they were in demand. As such, the tariff actually paid on each 
good would be the same throughout the FTA  (and it would be the lowest tariff prevailing in any 
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divert textile imports from East Asian or other sources, in order to qualify for 
duty-free entry into the U.S. market.13 
Rules of origin can be set in one of  several forms.14  These include a “sub- 
stantial transformation” criterion, a change in tariff heading (CTH) criterion, a 
value-added criterion, and a specified process criterion. The substantial trans- 
formation criterion is essentially a common law criterion and, when contested, 
is decided by the courts. The CTH criterion appears somewhat more formulaic 
but in fact requires specification of what level of tariff heading is involved 
(eight-digit, four-digit, three-digit, etc.) and requires tariff headings to be up- 
dated with changes in technology.’5  Even the value-added Criterion, which ap- 
pears to be a more standardized way of proceeding,16  raises enforcement diffi- 
~ulties,’~  as accounting methods must be agreed upon and audits are necessary 
to ascertain whether ROOs have in fact been met. And, of course, any process 
criterion  (e.g.,  triple  transformation)  must be  specified  for each individual 
product. As Palmeter (1993) has pointed  out, all of  these rules give rise to 
problems of bureaucratic implementation and interpretation. In an important 
sense, however, the CTH criterion (by virtue of the ability to have a “not else- 
where classified” category) is the most inclusive. Under other criteria, new 
rules must be devised for new products. 
Rules of origin are naturally far more important in FTAs than in customs 
unions, where there is already a common external tariff and so trade deflection 
is much less of a problem. They are also more important, the higher the exter- 
nal tariffs of  member countries.18 Moreover, they provide an opportunity for 
representatives of individual interest groups to lobby to avoid competition from 
imports.  These  groups  can  pressure  to  obtain  an  “export  of  protection” 
(through an ROO that will make it profitable to buy higher-priced intermediate 
goods in the partner country to satisfy the ROO), or they can lobby to ensure 
13. See Krueger (1993) for a demonstration that ROOs can “export” the protection policies of 
one trading partner-in  this case, U.S.  protection of  its textile industry-to  the other, it., the 
Mexican producers who now find it worth their while to purchase U.S. textiles even if they cost 
more. 
14. See Palmeter (1993) for a more complete discussion of these categories. 
IS.  As pointed out by  Palmeter (1993), agreeing on new tariff classifications across countries 
(predominantly in new high-tech industries) entails disputes about what the relevant tariff classi- 
fications should be. And, even under existing tariff schedules, there are many disputes over the 
appropriate tariff category for imported items. 
16. See Lloyd (1993). who advocated exclusive reliance on a value-added criterion that, in his 
view, should be the same in all preferential trading arrangements. Difficulties with the value-added 
criterion include accounting problems that inevitably arise in allocating costs, problems that arise 
with respect to exchange rate changes, and the apparent discrimination against developing coun- 
tries, whose relatively low wage rates for unskilled labor may imply that value added will be a 
smaller fraction of output price than is the case for goods produced in richer countries. ASEAN 
countries have a value-added (40  percent) ROO in their agreement. 
17. There are also criteria couched in physical terms, as when cigarette producers in Australia 
were required to use 50 percent domestic tobacco in the production of cigarettes. 
18. There are, nonetheless, ROOs in customs unions. E.g., semiconductors are considered to 
originate in the European Union only if the diffusion process is undertaken in the Union. 16  Anne 0.  Krueger 
very stringent ROOs (thus preventing imports in some cases). Clearly, when 
U.S. auto parts producers insisted on a high percentage of value added (62.5 
percent) as a criterion for conferring origin, the intent was to ensure that Mexi- 
can assemblers found it profitable to use U.S., and not foreign, auto parts. 
Textile producers presumably achieved a similar victory with their triple trans- 
formation rule. But when it was decided that using milk produced in one signa- 
tory to NAFTA to make cheese in another signatory did not confer origin, the 
intent was clearly protectionist for the dairy industry. 
Even when ROOs are not highly protectionist in intent, they increase pro- 
ducers’ costs and require administrative surveillance. It is estimated that when 
EFTA countries’ producers provided documentation on origin to enter EU mar- 
kets duty-free, the costs of providing the documents were the equivalent of 3-5 
percent of the delivered cost of the goods. Producers chose on occasion to pay 
the duties rather than provide the documentation necessary to establish origin 
(see Herrin 1986). Accounting for joint costs, providing records as to which 
inputs were used in what goods, and otherwise establishing a record of costs 
sufficient to satisfy origin is not simple, unless the CTH criterion is used to 
establish origin. 
Before turning attention to problems with overlapping FTAs, one last phe- 
nomenon should be noted. The European Union, by far the most successful, 
visible, and long-lasting preferential trading arrangement, was mostly of  the 
GATT-plus variety, at least until the 1980s (when the protectionist effects of 
the Common Agricultural Policy [CAP] began to outweigh the trade liberaliz- 
ing effects of successive rounds of multilateral trade reductions). That is, while 
the members of  the European Union were eliminating trade barriers among 
themselves, they were also reducing external trade barriers. Thus, although 
intra-EU trade grew very rapidly after the Treaty of Rome, EU trade with the 
rest of  the world also rose rapidly. Indeed, until the late 1970s EU external 
trade as a percentage of EU GDP rose during the period of increasing Euro- 
pean integration. In 1958,  just as the Treaty of Rome was taking effect, intrare- 
gional European trade constituted 52.8 percent of  its total trade, and extrare- 
gional trade 47.2 percent. By 1993, the intraregional share was 69.9 percent, 
and correspondingly, the share of European trade with non-EU countries had 
fallen to 31.1 percent. However, in 1958, extraregional trade of the members 
of the European Community accounted for 15.8 percent of GDP; in 1979, the 
figure was 16.1 percent. Only in the late 1980s did the share of European GDP 
accounted for by external trade begin to fall (WTO 1995, 39,40). Much of the 
European Union’s increased trade with the rest of the world was attributable, 
of course, to the multilateral tariff negotiations conducted under GATT aus- 
pices, with their liberalizing impact on trade fl0~s.I~ 
19. That European external trade as a percentage of GDP has fallen may be accounted for by 
several factors. One is probably the decrease in oil prices after the mid-1980s, which no doubt 
reduced the recorded importance of petroleum imports in Europe’s overall trade. It is likely, how- 
ever, that pressures associated with mounting production and declining imports of  agricultural 
commodities resulting from the CAP were also a significant contributor to this decline. 17  Problems with Overlapping Free Trade Areas 
It is likely that the European success in integrating internally while simulta- 
neously liberalizing externally accounts for a large part of the apparently un- 
critical acceptance of  preferential trading arrangements by  much of  the rest 
of  the world.20  Indeed, for the United States to endorse preferential trading 
arrangements in the 1980s was a significant reversal of policy,21  and one that 
would  probably  not  have  occurred  had  preferential  trading  arrangements 
not been associated in policymakers’ minds with continuing external liberal- 
ization. 
1.3  Prospective Difficulties with Overlapping FTAs 
It was already noted that there cannot be overlapping customs unions: by 
definition, a common external tariff means that countries are either members 
and maintain the common external tariff or they do not. By contrast, overlap- 
ping FTAs are possible precisely because each member of  an FTA  retains its 
own external tariff. For that reason, the problem of overlapping preferential 
trading arrangements is one that arises under FTAS.~~ 
It has elsewhere been shown that ROOs under FTAs can be trade diverting 
and, indeed, can “export” protection from one trading partner to another. To 
see this, assume that the United States has a tariff on automobiles and negoti- 
ates an ROO on Mexican assemblers of automobiles.  Assume further that, prior 
to the FTA, Mexican auto assemblers imported parts from third countries with 
no tariffs. It is easy to see that it could well become attractive for Mexican 
assemblers to import (high-cost, protected) U.S. auto parts in order to qualify 
for tariff exemptions when exporting their autos to the United States. As such, 
in entering an FTA with Mexico, the United States could “export” its protec- 
tion of auto parts to cover the Mexican market as welLZ3 
With one FTA, the problems associated with ROOs are already troublesome, 
in that they are complex and highly opaque.24  As can be seen from the discus- 
sion in section 1.2, there is no uniform way to set ROOs comparable to con- 
cepts such as a “uniform tariff.” Moreover, since ROOs are adapted in each 
20. In the late 1980s. when “Europe  1992” and the creation of the Single Market was under 
way, there was some alarmist discussion of the possibility of “Fortress Europe.” Since most deci- 
sions made under the 1992 initiative were liberalizing, this concern rapidly diminished. 
21. At the Bretton Woods conference and subsequently, the United States supported the open 
multilateral trading system and initially insisted on no exceptions. The United Kingdom, however, 
wanted to continue its Commonwealth preferences, and the resulting compromise was Article 24 
of the GATT articles. See Dam (1970,42). 
22. There can, of course, be an FTA between a customs union and nonmembers. There was an 
FTA in manufactures between the European Community and EFTA. 
23. The same result could occur if Mexico agreed to a common external tariff higher than that 
which had prevailed prior to the preferential trading arrangement.  Such an increase in tariffs, 
however, is transparent and could be appealed  under GATTWO mles. Under an FTA, there 
is no similar mechanism for compensation (by the lowering of other tariffs) since no tariff has 
been raised! 
24. Rules of origin take up around 200 pages of the NAlTA agreement. Bargaining over them 
was prolonged, and the final NAFTA agreement resulted only when exact formulas for ROOs for 
automobiles and textiles and apparel had been agreed upon. 18  Anne 0.  Krueger 
case to the particular tariff structures of the trading partners in an FTA, negotia- 
tions must take place on new ROOs for each new applicant to join the FTA. 
That property of a single FTA is a major problem with overlapping FTAs. 
Each new entrant provides an occasion for lobbyists to seek insulation (through 
restrictive ROOs) and to generate delays as each applicant seeks admission. 
While in principle very liberal ROOs might result (with a consequent lowering 
of average protection), the lack of transparency of the process, combined with 
the necessity for detailed negotiations, renders it likely that special interest 
groups will seek at each negotiation to secure ROOs they perceive to be favor- 
able to them. 
Consider, then, how much more difficult the case as the number of FTAs in 
which a country has membership increases. ROOs agreed upon under NAFTA, 
for example, might differ from those agreed upon in APEC. And, should APEC 
expand, the ROOs there could change in unpredictable ways. Representatives 
of individual industries would pressure for ROOs serving their particular inter- 
ests in ways that even the most ardent free trade negotiators would have diffi- 
culty disentangling. 
A minor example of this possibility recently arose in the United States, when 
California winegrowers discovered that Mexico’s FTA with Chile provided for 
Mexican tariffs on imports of Chilean wine to go to zero on 1 January 1997, 
while NAFTA provides a later date for zero tariffs on U.S. wines. The USTR 
dispatched negotiators to both Chile and Mexico in an effort to “correct” this 
problem! For ROOs that are not the same across all trading partners, similar 
problems are likely to emerge.25 
Under U.S. trade law, it is already true that a particular commodity can have 
different “origins” for purposes of  NAFTA, the CBI, labeling, and the Multi- 
Fiber Arrangement! Trade lawyers specialize in litigation over the origins of 
particular imports even without overlapping JTAs. With overlaps, even more 
export of  protection and disputes with customs over origin and satisfaction 
of ROOs would likely result. Inevitably, the customs clearance process itself 
would become more complex, if  not more prolonged.26  And possibilities for 
further integration through  “borderless” preferential  arrangements and  the 
elimination of border barriers (presumably one of  the raisons d’gtre for the 
regional nature of a preferential trade agreement) would be eliminated. 
In addition to these problems, the political economy of  preferential trade 
agreements is less conducive to further trade liberalization than is that of cus- 
toms unions. For, insofar as protection is exported through FTAs, all the re- 
25. There is also a problem that successive entrants may result in repeated trade and investment 
diversion. There are already reported instances of factories that moved to the Caribbean to take 
advantage  of  U.S.-extended  preferences  under  the  CBI that  then  relocated  in  Mexico  under 
NAFTA. One can well imagine yet further moves if countries such as Chile, Colombia, Brazil, and 
Argentina enter sequentially. 
26. The existence of different rates of duty for imports from different countries also gives rise 
to additional scope for false invoicing (to show origin in the country subject to lower duties) and 
to corruption, as officials may misclassify goods to give lower rates of duty. 19  Problems with Overlapping Free Trade Areas 
sulting increase in trade represents an increase in the economic size, if not the 
number, of producers who have (and can readily perceive) a vested interest in 
opposing moves toward trade liberalization and the open multilateral system.27 
Thus, FTAs are suspect simply because of the greater complexity of ROOs 
under them than under customs unions. Overlapping FTAs are doubly suspect, 
in light of the additional complexity and opacity they bring to trade measures.2s 
When it is recognized that overlapping FTAs would also lead to competition 
among producers facing different costs of production (because of the imported 
items subject to duty at different rates in the individual countries), further ques- 
tions arise. A particular type of overlapping FTA system has been referred to 
in the literature as the “hub and spoke” system-under  which producers in a 
country that has multiple FTAs may have cost advantages over producers in 
each of the “spokes,” which have FTAs only with the center country.29  When- 
ever there are “artificial” cost differences (due to differences in tariff height in 
this case) between competitors or between locations, economic inefficiencies 
must result, and FTAs-especially  overlapping ones-seem  by their very na- 
ture to be likely to be conducive to these inefficiencie~.~~ 
To be sure, if  producers in country A are aware that their competitors in 
country B are advantaged because some imported inputs cost less by virtue of 
B’s membership in an FTA of which A is not a member or because B has lower 
tariffs on imports from the rest of the world, they may put pressure on their 
government to reduce its own external tariffs.31  However, insofar as new activi- 
ties are located, or existing firms choose expansion locations, in particular 
countries because of artificially lower costs, there will be two consequences. 
First, economic inefficiencies associated with different costs will result. Sec- 
ond, there will arise further pressure against subsequent multilateral trade lib- 
eralization as those choosing locations on the basis of these artificial cost dif- 
ferences oppose measures  that  reduce their  advantages. There is even the 
possibility (although one suspects that pressure groups are sufficiently aware 
27. For those exporters who would support free trade, the value of further multilateral trade 
liberalization is diminished with every new entrant into a preferential trade arrangement, so that 
exporters’ support for multilateral liberalization is likely to diminish as vested interests profiting 
from trade diversion increase. 
28. It has been reported that despite Chile’s uniform tariff, there are increasing delays in customs 
as officials attempt to determine which preferential schedule, if any, a particular imported consign- 
ment should enter under. As Chile has extended preferential arrangements, the problem has in- 
creased in seventy. 
29. See Hoekman and Leidy (1993) for further discussion. The issue was earlier raised in con- 
sidering Korea’s interests in an FTA with the United States. See Park and Yo0 (1989). 
30. If producers in different countries with different input costs continue competing, one of the 
competitors may be able to use the “artificial” lower costs to offset part of the “natural” compara- 
tive advantage the other producer has. 
31. This has already happened in Canada, where tariffs were reduced on a number of items 
because Canadian producers recognized that they were confronted with cost disadvantages vis-L- 
vis American producers because of lower American tariffs. It is also reported that some Australian 
producers have demanded lower tariffs on imported inputs as they face competition from New 
Zealand producers. 20  Anne 0.  Krueger 
of their interests to avert it) of repetitive trade diversion as new members are 
added with new  ROOs to an FTA, or as a member of  one FTA  then joins a 
second one! 
Related to the above, questions arise about the pulls for foreign investment 
under  overlapping  FTAs.  The  same considerations that  may  bias  location 
choice for local producers will surely affect potential foreign investors as they 
seek out low-cost locations. While comparative advantage for a particular ac- 
tivity may be sufficiently large in a particular country that distortions intro- 
duced by different cost structures (determined by each country’s particular FTA 
memberships) do not affect location, there are surely instances in which differ- 
ences in input costs (among goods whose prices ought to be similar except for 
transport cost margins) would dominate the decision. Again, it must be con- 
cluded that possibilities for the play of special interest groups, increased trade 
diversion, and consequent opposition to further multilateral trade liberalization 
are likely to increase as the prevalence of overlapping FTAs mounts. 
Questions may also be asked about different FTAs in which members have 
different macroeconomic balances. The evidence from the past 50 years clearly 
demonstrates that more open economies (such as Mexico’s in  1994 and Eu- 
rope’s  in  1992) are more vulnerable to even small differences in macroeco- 
nomic and exchange rate policies. Countries whose major trading partners have 
very different inflation trajectories already have problems with exchange rate 
management. With overlapping FTAs, these problems can only increase. Suc- 
cessful FTAs will be trade liberalizing among members, but that in turn implies 
that they must increase the sensitivity of producers within the FTAs to differ- 
ences in macroeconomic policies. One can only ask what the consequences 
would be for a country affiliated with two FTAs, if  in one FTA  price levels 
were reasonably stable and in the other the inflation rate was 5-10  percentage 
points higher. With shifts in macropolicy among FTA  partners in one or the 
other bloc, individual producers would surely be subject to greater shocks than 
would be the case were macroeconomic policies more closely aligned. While 
this consideration carries force in FTAs and customs unions generally, the pos- 
sibilities for differing policies among countries in different, but overlapping 
FTAs seem to offer even more scope for difficulty. 
1.4  Implications for East Asian Countries 
East Asian countries have been successful in reaching high levels of produc- 
tivity and economic growth in part because of  their willingness to integrate 
with the international economy. In part, that willingness itself originated in the 
early recognition that trade was essential for those countries in light of  their 
own factor endowments and comparative advantages. 
Continued growth in East Asia, as elsewhere, will depend on a variety of 
factors, including measures to increase the efficiency with which markets func- 
tion and to reduce regulatory burdens. But no one can doubt that East Asia’s 21  Problems with Overlapping Free Trade Areas 
future growth prospects  will be much brighter with a healthy  international 
economy than they would be were the international economy to stagnate. 
For that reason, East Asians have a  strong stake in the open multilateral 
trading system. Political support for the WTO and leadership in strengthening 
the open multilateral system constitute perhaps the most important line of de- 
fense against the possibly protective effects of regional trading arrangements. 
This would entail support for settling the “new issues” on the WTO agenda, 
strengthening disciplines in services and agricultural trade, and facilitating the 
achievement of multilateral agreements on these issues. 
Beyond that, it is important for East Asian countries to ensure that their own 
regional arrangements do not discriminate preferentially. Asia as a whole has 
a lower share of intraregional trade than  does Europe,  and  an index of the 
intensity of intratrade (taking into account both the share of regional trade in 
total trade and the share of total trade in GDP) gives Asia a much lower index 
than the United States (Anderson and Horheim  1994, 134). Moreover, East 
Asia’s growth has been associated with a reduced share of intraregional trade 
(see Petrie 1994, 118). In part, that is because much of the intraregional trade 
historically was in raw materials. As countries began developing manufactured 
exports, the scope for trade within the region lessened.  Worldwide markets 
would appear to be especially vital to the prospects of developing countries in 
Asia, as they grow through an outer-oriented trade strategy. 
The APEC initiative, which has promised free trade for the developed coun- 
tries in the region by 2010, and for the developing countries by  2020, raises 
interesting questions. On one hand, leaders have been  careful to talk about 
“open regionalism,” which implies the absence of preferences. If countries will 
individually adopt free trade multilaterally and remove all tariff and other trade 
barriers by those target dates, there will clearly be no preferences, but there 
then  arises the question as to why  the grouping is “regional.” If  the region 
had a higher than average share of intraregional trade to start with, removal of 
remaining  tariff barriers multilaterally  might nonetheless  strengthen trading 
ties within the region relative to those with the rest of  the world. Given the 
region’s below-average intraregional trade, however, it is difficult to understand 
how the arrangement would be regional. 
Despite these questions, there is little doubt that Asia’s interests lie in an 
open trading system among all nations of  the world and that preferential ar- 
rangements  within Asia would,  in Asia’s self-interest, need to be  “building 
blocs,” and not “stumbling blocs,” to further liberalization of trade globally. 
1.5  Conclusion 
It has elsewhere been argued that customs unions, which do not raise protec- 
tion against nonmembers (and are therefore consistent with WTO rules), can- 
not be any less economically efficient than FTAs and will be more conducive 
to  support for further multilateral trade liberalization (Krueger  1995). They 22  Anne 0.  Krueger 
also greatly reduce the opportunities for supporters of protection to exercise 
influence whenever accession of a new member to the agreement is proposed. 
The arguments appear to apply with even more force to overlapping FTAs 
as contrasted with customs union enlargement. The initial vision behind the 
U.S. switch in  stance toward  support for preferential arrangements that are 
GATT-plus was that these agreements would be conducive to such large gains 
that others would be induced to join, thereby achieving further liberalization 
of trade. It is difficult to imagine that a series of overlapping FTAs, with differ- 
ent ROOs attendant for different countries’ access, the need for individual pro- 
ducers to know and keep records for a variety of ROO requirements, and the 
complications associated with negotiations for accession of  additional mem- 
bers, will lead to that WTO-plus world. 
If, instead, a customs union were formed, requirements for accession would 
be straightforward: adopt the same external tariff. Moreover, trade diversion 
within the union must be less, and there cannot be uneconomic choices in- 
duced by tariff differentials that then increase resistance to further liberaliza- 
tion (although trade diversion and, with it, resistance to liberalization can still 
occur). One can imagine enlargement of a customs union until it encompasses 
the entire world and, with it, increased trade liberalization the entire way. 
If, instead, more and more overlapping FTAs  form, with complex ROOs, 
no further accessions are straightforward, and the end of  the process is not 
membership of all and an open multilateral free-trading  If all that re- 
mained were requirements that producers satisfy ROOs, that would nonethe- 
less require border inspections, more complex customs procedures, and costs 
to producers for providing the documentation. The problems of proliferating 
overlapping FTAs deserve considerably more critical attention than they have 
so far received. 
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